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Abstract
This study uses a VAR methodology to evaluate the impact of the macroeconomic condi-
tions and money supply in the uctuation of nonperforming loans for the Portuguese economy.
Additionally, the feedback eect of nonperforming loans growth to the economy and specially
to the credit supply is analised. The study is motived by the hypothesis that loan quality is
procyclical and that the fast growth of credit supply has a positive relation with the growth
of nonperforming loans. The hypothesis that nonperforming loans reinforce economic fragili-
ties and credit market frictions is also tested. Empirical results corroborate both hypothesis
presented. Hence, it was possible to establish that the macroeconomic conditions - measured
by GDP and unemployment - and the fast growth of credit supply contribute to the develop-
ment of nonperforming loans. Furthermore, the growth of nonperforming loans reinforces the
economic cycle, as it contributes to the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions and creates
frictions in the credit market that may results in a credit crunch.
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1 Introduction
The macroeconomic conditions following the 2008 crisis have been favourable to the deteriora-
tion of the loan portfolio quality and consequently to the increase of the nancial system fragilities.
This crisis highlighted the necessity to link the macroeconomic conditions to the performance of
the nancial system. Hence, nancial regulators have dedicated considerable attention to macroe-
conomic stress-testing1 over the past decade.
Furthermore, the recent crisis has demonstrated that frictions in the credit market and nancial
system can exacerbate the cyclical uctuation, contradicting the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem
in which the nancial structure is irrelevant to the real economy outcomes. Thus, those frictions on
the credit market - higher number of doubtful loans and bankruptcies, rise of debt burden, declining
asset and collateral values and bank failures - are not only a consequence of the downturn but a
factor contributing to the economic slowdown. This eect may be materialized directly through
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or indirectly through the credit supply chain. The direct
eect is explained by the probability of higher number of insolvencies, bankruptcies or foreclosures,
hindering the aggregate supply. The indirect eect is explained by the credit squeeze that might
be felt during recession periods. As credit supply is partially responsible for demand of goods and
services a shortening of credit induces aggregate demand to tank. For instance, these frictions have
been cited as sources of the economic contractions felt during the Great Depression (Fisher, 1933).
In his study the author atributes the severity of the crisis to the high debt burden and subsequent
nancial distress.
Hence the study of the dynamics of nonperforming loans is a relevant topic2 as they serve
as an indicator of nancial imbalances and can contribute to the retrenchment of the economic
performance. Moreover, the recent crisis demonstrated the necessity of properly managing credit
risk in relation with the macroeconomic environment.
Using a VAR methodology this study evaluates the impact of the economic environment and the
money supply on the loan portfolio quality for the Portuguese economy. The proposed hypothesis is
that the retrenchment of economic performance and the fast growth of credit supply may translate
1Macroeconomic stress-testing refers to the techniques used to evaluate the vulnerability of the nancial system
to adverse developments in the economy. To a complete review of macro stress-testing methodology see Sorge (2004).
2Many authors have considered the importance of nonperforming loans to assess nancial system fragilities.
Reinhar and Rogo (2010) show that nonperforming loans can mark the onset of a nancial crisis and Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) established in their model that a liquidity shock can raise the level of doubtful loans, which may
originate bank runs.
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into the deterioration of asset quality harming banking performance. Additionally, the feedback
eect of nonperforming loans to the economy and especially to credit supply is analysed. The
hypothesis that higher levels of bad loans may reinforce the economic cycle is also tested.
The empirical results indicate that the macroeconomic environment and credit supply are key
determinants for asset quality uctuations. Furthermore, results demonstrate that an increase
in the growth rate of nonperforming loans creates frictions that exacerbate the macroeconomic
vulnerabilities.
The structure of the study is as follows: In the following section a brief analysis of the Portuguese
macroeconomic environment and the dynamics of nonperforming loans is presented. The third
section summarizes some of the existing empirical literature on the determinants of nonperforming
loans. In the fourth section the endogenous variables and the econometrics methodology applied
are described. The fth section discusses the results obtained and presents a robustness check for
the VAR model. The sixth section entails a robustness check for the model and the last section
concludes this study with some nal remarks.
2 Nonperforming loans
Ever since Portugal joined the European Economic Community (EEC)  precursor of the Eu-
ropean Union  there has been a considerable growth of the nancial system. The accession of
Portugal was a corner stone for the liberalization and modernization of the nancial sector, due to
an alignment of the Portuguese legal framework to European law. Furthermore the reshaped legal
framework allowed for the entry of new nancial intermediaries, either through private initiative
or foreign investment. The new paradigm of nancial system increased competition which, aligned
with favourable economic conditions, provided a new impetus to the credit supply.
Banking activity grew considerably during the last decades, for instance, loans to non-monetary
agents went from 77% of GDP in 1997 to 167% in 2008. By 2014 loans to individuals and non-
nancial corporations reached 170% of the GDP. This rise in debt burden made debtors more
exposed to adverse shocks to their income, increasing the likelihood of default. The steep increase
in domestic credit was most likely due to a rightward shift of the supply and demand curve. On the
demand side, higher expectations of future income provided incentives for rms to invest and lead
individuals to smooth their consumption through borrowing. Therefore, the cyclical behaviour of
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borrower's net wealth is essential to explain the uctuations of credit supply. Furthermore, the raise
in housing prices and the introduction of incentives to mortgage loans, through low interest rates,
were also important factors. These conditions made the demand curve shift to the right. As for the
supply side, the increasing competition for market share may provide the necessary explanation for
this boost. Principal-agent problems can contribute to this expansion, specially for new players,
as managers seek higher market share and short-term protability extending loans to higher risk
borrowers.
Additionally, the nancial sector was characterized by a high concentration of credit in certain
industries. The construction sector accounted for almost 50% of the credit supply by 1997, followed
by the wholesale/retail sector with 38%. Nonetheless, this tendency has been inverted and by 2008
only 13.5% and 12%3 of the loan supply was allocated in each industry, respectively. Overall, by
the crisis period, aggregated credit supply was allocated almost evenly among industries4. This
fact contributed to a reduction of credit risk in the nancial sector, taking into consideration that
diversication in loan supply and nonperforming loans have a negative relation 5. As for the credit
to individuals, by 1997, 70% of the accumulated supply was allocated in mortgages, with the
remaining 30% in consumption loans. By the crisis period mortgage loans increased by 15%, in



















Figure 1: Nonperforming loans for individuals and non-nancial corporations
3Debt-to-GDP data retrieved from Bank of Portugal.
4In 2007 the accumulated credit supply to non-nancial corporations was as follow: Real Estate 16%, Construction
15%, Transformation Industry 13%, Wholesale/Retail 12%, Financial Holdings 9% and others 25%.
5Salas and Saurina (2002) demonstrated that causality link by using bank size as a proxy for diversication
opportunities.
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During this period nonperforming loans of household reached a maximum of 2 334 Million Euros
by November 2007 while for non-nancial corporations the highest value was 2 190 Million by May
1998. For the period comprehended between 2003 and 2008 the non-nancial corporations loan
quality registered an improvement, reaching an all time low of 1 494 Millions by April 2005. During
the same period household nonperforming loans rose above the level registered by non-nancial
corporations. After the nancial crisis of 2008 both indicators exhibit an upwards trend, resulting
in an all time high of 12 980 Millions for non-nancial corporations in December 2013 and 5 318
Million for households in August 2008. From these values it is clear that the nancial crisis had
a much harder impact on the level of nonperforming loans for non-nancial corporations than
for households. The dierences observed in the level of nonperforming loans for households and
companies might be explained by a higher sensitivity of the latter to the business cycle. Nevertheless,
the illustrated behaviour seems to corroborate the notion that the level of credit risk is built up
during economic booms and materializes in downturns (Borio and Lowe, 2002).
The economic slowdown felt in Europe after the crisis had a signicant impact and by 2014
the EU area average of nonperforming loans ratio spiked to 8%, while before the crisis period it
represented less than 3%. This reality was much more evident for countries where the economic
deterioration was stronger such as for the so called PIIGS. By 2014 in Portugal the nonperforming
loan ratio was estimated to be over 11%, corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 30%
since 2008. Italy recorded a value of 17%, a 31% average growth, Ireland 25%, Spain 9%, with an
average growth of 192% and 34% respectively and Greece with a record high of 33%, representing
an average growth of 900%6.
Nevertheless, these gures need to be interpreted with caution considering that there is no
euro-area wide classication for nonperforming loans which compromises the comparability of the
aforementioned values. The distinct national regulation and supervision practices create a bias
across dierent countries. For instances, the Portuguese classication presents a slight downward
bias in nonperforming loans classication when compared to other EU countries, due to the fact
that only the amount overdue is considered as nonperforming (Barisitz, 2013).




The literature on the subject has been mainly divided by the type of variables considered to
explain the uctuation of asset quality. The determinants generally included in the models studying
loan quality are bank-level, macroeconomic factors or a mix of both. While the former considers a
set of bank level variables - idiosyncratic factors - in order to describe asset quality variability, the
second takes into consideration variables that measure the macroeconomic environment  systematic
factors  regarding those as core drivers of loan quality uctuation. As for the latter a set of
idiosyncratic and systematic factors are consider to explain these uctuations.
One example of bank level analyses is the work of Salas and Saurina (2002) which studies
the eect of ineciency, measured through the ratio between operating expenses and operating
margin, and capital-to-asset ratio on problem loans, for the Spanish nancial system. The authors
established that while ineciency exhibits a positive correlation with nonperforming loans, capital-
to-asset ratio displays the opposite eect. Furthermore, Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Podpiera
and Weill (2008) found that the decrease in cost eciency entails an increase in nonperforming
loans, in line with the bad management hypothesis 7. Other studies conclude that bank-level
variables, such as bank size, capital ratio, equity-to-asset ratio, return on equity (ROE)8, were also
signicant determinants of loan quality.
In the systematic approach authors consider that macroeconomic conditions aect borrowers'
capacity to repay debt, thus aecting loan quality and the performance of the banking sector; such
analysis can be recovered in the work of Ali and Daly (2010), Bofondi and Ropele (2011) and Pesola
(2005). Hence, macroeconomic variables are often good indicators of loan quality.
One of the main drivers of risk is GDP - an indicator of the cyclical position of the economy.
For instance, Baboucek and Jancar (2005) established the relationship between economic cycle and
bank risk through an unrestricted VAR model. The empirical results exhibit a negative correlation
between GDP growth and nonperforming ratio (nonperforming over total loans), thus an acceler-
ation of GDP lead to a deterioration of the nonperforming loan ratio. In line with these ndings,
Beck et al. (2013), Fofack (2005) and Blaschke and Jones (2001) also established that as economic
conditions worsen, during downturn periods such as recessions, the quality of banks' assets tend to
deteriorate. Consequently, the business cycle, and the economic environment emerges as key drivers
7This hypothesis links `bad' management with poor skills in credit scoring, appraisal of pledged collaterals and
monitoring borrowers.
8The study of such variables can be found in Makri et al. (2014), Klein (2013) and Espinoza and Prasad (2010).
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aecting credit quality. Another relevant point is the possible feedback eect stemming from the
nancial sector to the economy. In order to evaluate this eect, Klein (2013) studied the determi-
nants of nonperforming loans for Central and Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE), through
a VAR analysis. The results demonstrated that an increase in nonperforming loans has a signicant
impact on credit (measured as total credit as a percentage of GDP), GDP growth, ination and
unemployment with a lag of one quarter. Also in line with these ndings, Nkusu (2010) explored
the feedback eect of nonperforming loans for 26 advanced economies, through impulse response
functions (IRFs) analysis. Both studies found that banking system fragilities and deterioration in
economic activity reinforce each other, adversely aecting the economic environment.
Louzis et al. (2011) establishes the link between macroeconomic determinants and nonperform-
ing loans across dierent loan categories  consumption, mortgage and business  for the Greek
economy. This approach enabled the authors to disentangle the impact of the determinants for
each type of nonperforming loan. Empirical evidence demonstrated that there are signicant qual-
itative and quantitative dierences among the eects of determinants under analysis. For instance,
mortgages loans were found to be the least responsive to shifts in macroeconomic conditions. The
authors also determined that unemployment was one of the factors inuencing all loan categories,
in particular business loans. Therefore, a higher unemployment rate leads to an increase of nonper-
forming loans, considering that it aects borrowers' capability to repay loans, thus aecting asset
quality negatively9 .
Several empirical studies validate the importance of credit supply as a central driver of non-
performing loans. Keeton (1998) has established this hypothesis under the condition that credit
growth departures from a supply shift. Such a shift, caused either by an increase in competition or
an underestimation of credit risk during expansion periods, induces credit standards to fall, which
in turn leads to a rise in nonperforming loans. On the other hand, if loan growth is due to a demand
shift, caused for example by an increase in productivity, it may not imply an increase in loan losses.
Thus, the author points to a positive correlation between variables, imposing that an increase in
credit growth leads to higher loan losses, under a supply shift situation. Other studies analysing
the relationship between nonperforming loans and credit growth, such as Festic et al. (2011) and
Kiss (2006), also determined the same dynamics found by Keeton. All the aforementioned studies
established that the increase in credit supply, alongside with an ease in credit standards, leads to an
9Similar results are presented in the work of Gambera (2000) Aver (2008) and Babihuga (2007).
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increase in default rates. Nonetheless, a lagged relationship is established, considering nonperform-
ing loans take longer to arise as individuals and companies only experience debt service problems
after the rst year.
Furthermore, the level of private indebtedness, savings, ination and the exchange rate were
found to have a signicant impact on credit risk measures 10.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
The analysis in this study uses time-series data drawn from published information of Bank of
Portugal as well as from Eurostat11. The sample covers monthly data from 1997 to 2014, capturing
the dynamics of the Portuguese economy for two distinct periods; economic expansion from 1997 to
2008 and economic contraction from 2008 onwards. Although the data span is limited, it provides
the possibility to isolate the specic macroeconomic determinants that drive nonperforming loans
for the Portuguese economy.
For this study aggregate indicators are used instead of disaggregate indicators (bank individual
data), the choice of aggregate data was made to overcome the risk of non-representativeness of
the sample (Boudriga et al. 2009). Furthermore, the choice of variables included in the model
reects the vast empirical literature on the determinants of the loan portfolios quality. Hence this
model specication includes four macroeconomic variables, GDP, captured by the coincident indi-
cator of activity (ECOACT)12, unemployment rate (UNEM), credit supply from monetary nancial
institutions13, proxied by the monetary aggregate M214 and nonperforming loans of nonnancial
corporations and individuals (NPL). The choice of a parsimonious number of endogenous variables
is justied by the fact that this study applies the VAR methodology for which the increase of
variables erodes observations rapidly. Additionally a dummy variable was included in the model
10Empirical analyses on the impact of the aforementioned determinants can be found in Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) Rinaldi and Arellano (2006), Festic et al. (2011) and English (1999).
11The source of each variable considered is presented in the Table B.1
12The coincident indicator of activity is a composite indicator compiled and published by Bank of Portugal. The
input series reect the demand and supply side of the economy, income and the conditions in the labour market.
A plot of the coincident indicator of activity and the GDP can be seen in Figure A.1. For details regarding the
methodology of the Economic Activity Coincident Indicator see Rua (2004).
13The monetary nancial institutions considered include universal banks, savings banks, mutual agricultural credit
banks and money market funds assets.
14M2 comprises deposits with an agreed maturity of up to and including two years or redeemable at a period of
notice of up to and including three months. Currency in circulation is excluded.
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to account for the nancial crisis period. The variable assumes value one from the rst month of
2008 onwards and zero otherwise. The dummy was introduced in order to capture the eect of the
enconomic deterioration on the growth of nonperforming loans. The descriptive statistics and a
detailed list of the variables considered can be found in the appendix (Table B.1 and B.2).
For this study nonperforming loans are considered as dened in article 4th notice 3/95 of Bank
of Portugal 15. According to it, nonperforming loans are those with principal or interest 90 days or
more overdue or that present a well dened weaknesses, compromising debtor capability to repay
the loan, such as the declaration of bankruptcy, or debtor liquidation 16. The gure below (Figure
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Figure 2: Data description
Figure 2.1 (ECOACT) presents the coincident indicator of activity and as expected it presents
a relatively high rate for the years prior to 2000. For the following decade, the economic indicator
starts to plunge, describing an irregular pattern from 2008 onwards. Although it records some
improvements in economic conditions for the post crisis period, the series entails a signicant
uctuation. Thus, a slight downward trend can be identied during this period, considering that
the indicator never recovered to values reached by the end of 2007. The indicator reaches a record
high of 4.8% in April 1998 and an all time low of -4.1% in January 2012. This series' mean is 0.84%,
while it presents a standard deviation of 2.27.
15For further information see http://www.bportugal.pt/
16The amount registered as nonperforming reects installments overdue for more than 90 days and amount con-
sidered to be of doubtful recovery. To be classied as doubtful, the loans as to present interest and capital arrears
exceed 25% of the outstanding capital plus interest fallen due.
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Figure 2.2 (M2) comprises the Portuguese contribution for the monetary aggregate M2. It ex-
hibits a clear upward trend from 1997 to 2008 following the credit supply expansion which preceded
the nancial crisis. From 2008 to 2010 the expansionary trend is reverted. In 2010 there is a short
lived improvement which retrenches signicantly, thus from 2011 onwards the series decline again
shifting to a downward trend. The monetary aggregate reaches 166 823 million Euros, the maxi-
mum value for the series, in February 2009 and a minimum of 92 357 by February 1998. The mean
corresponds to 133 387 million Euros and the standard deviation to 20 122 millions.
Figure 2.3 (NPL) presents some interesting characteristics worth mentioning. The series exhibits
a stable behaviour between late 1997 until 2007. Nevertheless, by 2008 an upward trend emerged
which achieved its peak by December 2012, where the amount of nonperforming loans rose above 1
8055 million Euros. These features illustrates the highly cumulative and persistent character of the
variable. The record low of 2 774 million Euros was reached in June 2000. Nonperforming loans
present a mean of 6 586 million Euros and a standard deviation of 4 774 million.
The last variable, considered in Figure 2.4 (UNEM), describes the evolution of the unemployment
rate for the sample period. It follows the expected pattern, in accordance with the phase of the
economic cycle. Therefore, the series has a slight downward trend from 1997 to 2000, following the
economic cycle and from 2000 onwards, the series has an upward trend, following the deterioration
of the economic environment. The unemployment rate reaches an all time high of 17.5% in January
2013 and a record low of 4.1% in December 2000. The series presents an average of 9.1% and a
standard deviation of 3.78%.
4.2 Model specication




Φjyt−j + εt (1)
where:
 yt is a vector of endogenous variables
 c is a vector of intercepts
 Φj are the coecient matrices
 εt is a vector of disturbance terms
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As described previously, the purpose of this study is to analyse the determinants that aect
loan quality for the Portuguese economy. The choice of endogenous variables included in the model
departed from the vast literature on the subject. Nonetheless, this choice was conditioned by the
frequency of the data being this another reason bank level factors were excluded from this study.
The variables were tested for seasonality and properly adjusted by the X-12 seasonal adjustment
method 17.
In order to avoid spurious regressions and determine the level of integration of the time series
an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey-Fuller, 1979) was performed. Due to the results of the
unit root tests, which can be seen in Table B.5, the endogenous variables NPL, Unemployment and
Credit were dierenced 18. The lag length structure of the VAR under analysis was chosen based
on the AIC information criteria (Akaike 1987). Therefore, a VAR model of order 4 was specied,
accordingly to the results displayed in Table B.6. This specication allows for a suciently long lag
structure in order to capture the well known delayed eects some variables might present. Thus,
the vector of transformed endogenous variables is:
yt ≡
[
DLNPLt DLM2t DUNEMt ECOACTt
]
where:
 DLNPLt - growth rate of nonperforming long
 DLM2t - growth rate of the monetary aggregate M2
 DUNEMt - growth rate of unemployment
 ECOACTt - coincident indicator of activity
Furthermore, the Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) was performed for the VAR model of
length 4. Consequently, the results of the Wald test can be seen in Table 1. As it is possible
to observe the endogenous variables, for which the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality was
rejected are highlighted. It is relevant to mentioned that the variables for which the null was not
rejected were kept in the model given that they do not vary independently of each other (Greene,
2013).
17With exception of unemployment all variables were seasonally adjusted.
18NPL and Credit were dierenced in logarithms. As argued by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) this methodology
enables an approximation to the monthly percentage growth.
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Table 1: VAR - Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Variable DLNPL ECOACT DLM2 DUNEM
DLNPL - 0.5518 0.2066 0.0187*
ECOACT 0.0377* - 0.0010* 0.2243
DLM2 0.4331 0.0675** - 0.8655
DUNEM 0.3476 0.1711 0.1672 -
Joint Wald 0.0793** 0.2062 0.0000* 0.0340*
Note: The null hypothesis in this case is: each variable in the rows does not Granger cause each variable in the
columns. Signicance levels are denoted as * signicant at 5%,** signicant at 10%.
The results of the Granger causality demonstrate that, at a 5% signicance level, the coincident
indicator of activity Granger causes nonperforming loan growth and the growth of credit supply,
represented by the variable DLM2. At the same nominal dimension value, the growth of nonper-
forming loans causes the growth of unemployment. For a 10% nominal level, the credit supply
Granger causes the coincident indicator.
As for the joint Granger causality the null hypothesis is rejected for three of the specications.
Thus the growth rate of nonperforming loans (DLNPL) is jointly caused by the remaining variables.
Unemployment growth rate (DUNEM) and credit supply growth rate (DLM2) are equally jointly
caused by the factors under analysis. Therefore, it is possible to establish that those variables are
not weakly exogenous to the model. Regarding the coincident indicator of activity (ECOACT) the
null hypothesis of non-Granger Causality is not rejected, being this variable weakly exogenous to
the specication. Nonetheless, this variable is included in the model considering it is the closest
proxy for the GDP of Portugal.
Granger-causality may not tell the complete story about the interactions between the variables
of a system. In applied work, it is often of interest to know the responses of one variable to an
impulse in another variable (Lutkepöhl 2005). Therefore, scrutiny of the results was divided in
the analysis of the impulse response functions (IRF) and variance covariance decomposition, which
can be seen in section 5. The IRF were estimated according to the decomposition of Pesaran and
Shin (1998). This method utilizes generalized impulses which do not depend on VAR ordering.
Lastly, the IRF condence intervals were calculated based on the Monte Carlo approach with 100
repetitions. The results presented do not dier substantially from other methods available.
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4.3 Diagnostic test
A battery of diagnostic tests was performed to ensure the model described the data appropriately
and was correctly specied. Notably, the VAR approach requires the residuals to behave like
Gaussian white noise. The heteroskedasticity of the residuals was tested through a White's test
with cross terms. The null hypothesis of homocedasticity was not rejected at the usual nominal
signicance levels, thus providing indication of a well specied model.
Furthermore, an Autocorrelation LM test was performed for which the results are presented
in Table B.12.1. Examining the serial correlation of the residuals is possible to observe that they
are well behaved given that up until the 5th lag the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is not
rejected. Additionally, an analysis through the display of pairwise cross-correlograms conrmed the
absence of signicant residual autocorrelation. Hence, the residuals seem to be independent over
time with constant conditional variance. To account for the stability of the model an analysis of
the inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial was also conducted. The results conrmed
the stability of the model as all roots lie within the unitary circle19.
5 Results and robustness test
5.1 Results and discussion
In this section a discussion of the results is presented. The analysis focus on the impulse response
functions (IRF) and variance covariance decomposition.
Table B.7 presents the results of the VAR model by introducing the estimation output (coe-
cients, standard errors and t-statistics). As it is possible to observe from the results only a small
number of coecients are signicant. According to Sims (1980) this result is to be expected bear-
ing in mind that the VAR approach is not suitable to interpret directly the estimates neither the
respective signs between variables due to multicoliniarity. The idea behind a VAR model analysis
is to determine the responses of endogenous variables to impulses in other endogenous variable,
establishing causality.
Uncovering the IRFs of the variables considered in the model, for a 12-month period, reveals the
dynamics between nonperforming loans and the economic environment measured by the coincident
indicator of activity, unemployment rate and credit supply. Examining the IRF it is possible to
19The results of the AR roots tests, LM Autocorrelation test, White's test and the correlogram are displayed in
the appendix.
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trace the eect of a one-time shock to the endogenous variables and trace its marginal eects
through all equations in the system. Figure 3 presents the IRF, estimated from the VAR model,
providing information regarding the dynamic interactions between the macroeconomic determinants
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Response of DLNPL to DUNEM
Figure 3: Impulse Response Function
Overall, the empirical results conrm the importance of indicators of general macroeconomic
performance as drivers of credit risk uctuations in the Portuguese economy. Moreover, following
the existing literature on the subject, it was possible to verify the procyclical behaviour of loan
quality. Thus, in a weak macroeconomic environment, such as recessions or downturns, the level of
nonperforming loans tends to increase, while during strong and favourable macroeconomic condi-
tions there is a reduction in the growth of nonperforming loans. The starting point of this analysis
is the response of DLNPL to shocks in the remaining determinants.
As suggested by the empirical literature, nonperforming loans have a negative correlation with
GDP growth. In this particular case, where the coincident indicator of activity growth served as a
proxy for GDP, it was possible to validate this theory. Thus, a positive shock to the ECOACT leads
to a negative response by DLNPL. An increase in the coincident indicator captures an economic
upturn where cash ows of borrowers are expected to augment allowing them to meet their nancial
obligations. On the other hand, during a downturn period the coincident indicator registers low
values, indicating a reduction of household and companies wealth, making it harder to meet their
obligations. From the gure is also possible to see that a shock to DLNPL reinforces itself leading
to positive reaction of DLNPL for the following periods.
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Moreover, consistent with the existing literature, a positive shock to unemployment growth rate
induces the nonperforming loans growth to spike. Thus, conrming the eect of the economic
cycle over nonperforming loans, as adverse economic conditions deteriorate loan quality. Therefore,
DUNEM exhibits a positive correlation with DLNPL, considering a positive shock in the former
variable creates an increase in DLNPL. The unemployment rate is also closely related to borrower's
wealth and their ability to serve debt. It aects negatively the future purchasing power of household
and individuals and limits the production of goods and services. Hence, unemployment diminishes
the cash ows of households and hinders eective demand. This eect causes a loss in non-nancial
rms' revenue, which in turn increases the debt burden.
The empirical results capture the expected dynamics of nonperforming loans and the macroe-
conomic background. The deterioration of the economic environment would lead to a drop of the
coincident indicator and a rise of unemployment aecting the ability of households and non-nancial
corporations to serve their debt, undoubtedly increasing the amount of bad loans. With a strong
economic growth, the wealth of household and non-nancial corporations expands contributing to
the decline of nonperforming loans.
As for the eect of the growth of credit supply the results show a positive correlation among
the variables. Nonetheless, the eect of a positive shock to the credit supply growth is not clear
for the rst lags, only exhibiting a clear positive eect after the sixth period. This result is not
a surprise considering the well documented lagged eect that credit supply has on nonperforming
loans20. As a result, a positive shock to DLM2 has an unclear eect on DLNPL for the rst ve
periods following the initial shock. The shock only exerts the expected eect after this initial phase,
particularly after the sixth period, where the shock to DLM2 has a positive impact on DLNPL.
The empirical results corroborate the hypothesis that faster credit growth leads to a surge in
bad loans. The loan growth eect might be explained by the aforementioned loosening of credit
standards of nancial institutions, during upturn periods, increasing the chances borrowers default
in downturns. Hence the the low quality of the loans extended during upturns materializes during
economic contractions. The factors contributing to the reduction of credit standards are two folded;
rst the increase in competition due to the liberalization of the market and entry of new players
reduces standards as more lenders compete for the same business. Second, during expansion peri-
ods lenders may underestimate the risk associated with new loans becaming too optimistic about
20For a detailed analysis on the lagged eect of credit supply on credit risk view Jimenez and Saurina (2006).
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borrowers capability to repay their debts.
As mentioned previously, the estimation of a VAR model was essential to enable the study
of the feedback eect of nonperforming loans to the macroeconomic environment and specially to
money supply. Hence, the gure below introduces the dynamic interactions of ECOACT, DUNEM,
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Function to a DLNPL innovation
From the IRF results it was also possible to access the feedback eect from nonperforming loans
to the macroeconomic performance. Consequently, nonperforming loans growth has a positive
correlation with the unemployment growth rate. Thus a positive shock to DLNPL generates a
positive impulse in DUNEM. The feedback eect was fully established through the impulse of
the variable ECOACT. A positive shock to DLNPL produces a negative impact in ECOACT.
Thus, there is evidence that nonperforming loans growth reinforces the business cycle. Hence,
during downturn periods higher growth of nonperforming loans contributes to the worsening of
economic conditions. This relation suggests that the default in loans amplify unemployment, most
likely through non nancial corporations bankruptcies or insolvencies. The second eect described
might be explained by the reduction of aggregate supply also caused by nonnancial corporations
bankruptcies.
17
Moreover, results show that the growth of nonperforming loans has a negative correlation with
credit supply growth. Nonetheless, this relationship is not clear for the IRF depicted previously
and it is only evident when considering a longer period for the IRF analyses, as in Figure 5. As a
result, imposing a positive shock to DLNPL induces the DLM2 to fall but this eect only becomes
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Response of DLM2 to DLNPL
Figure 5: Impulse Response Function
The reduced ability to lend can be explained by the necessity of the nancial institutions to
adjust their provisions21 for loan losses, which consumes capital that otherwise would be allocated
for more productive purposes22. Futhermore the excess of bad loans in the institutions balance
sheet might induce the lender to become risk adverse increasing credit standards. Although, it is
not possible to disentangle which is the cause of the credit retrenchment, it is clear that the quality
of loan portfolio contributes to the level of credit to the economy.
A second model was specied for which the variable Crisis was included to control for the
nancial crisis period and the structural break detected in the NPL times-series 23. As expected the
dummy variable coecient as a positive and signicant eect over DLNPL in the VAR estimation24.
These results fall in line with the theoretical expectations and the results presented previously.
Consequently, the deterioration of economic conditions harms the capability of borrowers to fulll
their obligations increasing the growth rate of nonperforming loans.
The empirical results obtained conrm the two hypotheses presented. The deterioration of
macroeconomic environment and fast growth of money supply contribute to the worsening of credit
quality. Furthermore, evidence that the growth of nonperforming loans represses credit supply is
presented.
21Basel II agreement requires nancial institutions to maintain the Tier 1 ratio equal or above 4%. The Tier 1
capital ratio is the ratio of a bank's core equity capital to its total risk-weighted assets (RWA).
22For a deeper analysis of the procyclicality of provision requirements see Keating et al. (2001).
23The results for the Quandt-Andrews Unknown Breakpoint test are presented in Table B.4.
24Estimation results for the VAR model with dummy can be seen in Table B.9.
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The variance decompositions for DLNPL is displayed in Table B.11, providing information
regarding the importance of each innovation and how it aects the variables in the VAR model.
This analysis is limited to the Cholesky orthogonal factorizations, turning the results sensitive to
the ordering of the endogenous variables. Therefore, the ordering criteria followed was: (1) NPL; (2)
UNEM; (3) M2; (4) ECOACT. This ordering was motivated by the intention to capture the impact
of the macroeconomic economic performance and the money supply to the growth of nonperforming
loans. Hence, by this ordering criteria NPL is caused by the remaining three endogenous variables.
The empirical results are in line with the conclusions for the analysis of the IRF. The economic
environment - measured through ECOACT and DUNEM - has an important role in the variation
of the nonperforming loans. Furthermore, the growth of credit supply (DLM2) also determines
the variation of nonperforming loans, despite the eect being clearly smaller then the economic
environment.
5.2 Cointegration Tests and VEC specications
As described above the endogenous variables considered were not all integrated of order 125. Hence,
the Johansen Cointegration test (Johansen, 1995) could not be performed for all variables due to
their dierent levels of integration. Nonetheless, it was possible to nd two cointegrating relations
among the I(1) variables - M2, NPL and UNEM. The results of the Johansen Cointegration test
are presented in Table B.7. From this results an error correction model (VEC) was specied in
order to properly identify the long-run equilibrium relationship among variables as suggested by
the Granger Representation Theorem (Engsted and Johansen 1997). In order to specify the VEC
and properly capture the eect of the macroeconomic environment one adjustments was made to
the initial endogenous variables. The stationary endogenous variable (ECOACT) was replaced by
the Industrial Production Index (IPI)26 , a integrated variable of order 1, as a proxy of GDP. A
comparisson of the two variables can be foiund in the appendix, Figure A.7.
From the model is possible to attest the long run equilibrium of the endogenous variables - NPL,
IPI, M2 and UNEM - and the signicance of the adjustment eects for all three variables.
25See Table B.5 for Dickey-Fuller Augmented test
26Industrial production measures the output of businesses integrated in industrial sector of the economy such as
manufacturing, mining, and utilities.
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Results in Table B.10 indicate that the error correction terms are statistically signicant. Hence,
the long-run adjustment eect - which measure the speed of covergency to equilibrium - of NPL
and M2 are 0,0059 and -0,003 respectively. Such an observation implies that while nonperforming
loans respond with a positive variation to a positive equilibrium error, money supply displays the
opposite behaviour, responding with a negative variation to a positive deviation from the long-run
equilibrium.
The IRFs for the VEC model, presented in Figure A.8, exhibits a distinct behaviour from the
one depicted in Figure A.6, considering that the impulses do not stabilize over time as in the
VAR model. This is coherent with the non-stationary nature of the endogenous variables. From
the same gure it is possible to conclude that the estimated model corroborate the main ndings
obtained for the VAR specication. LNPL exhibits a positive correlation with LM2 and UNEM
and a negative causality link with LIPI. The IRF also conrm the positive relation between past
realizations of LNPL and future LNPL. As for the impact of a shock to LNPL the endogenous
variables present the same behaviour described previously. Therefore, LIPI and LM2 present a
negative correlation, while UNEM has the opposite reaction. The clearer causality link established
between LNPL and LIPI might be explained by the closer relationship of the variables of interest.
Particularly, an increase in nonperforming loans of non-nancial corporations may suggest higher
bankruptcies which directly imply a retrenchment of industrial production and consequently a fall
of the IPI.
With these empirical results corroborate the notion that the economic performance and the
credit supply are relevant indicators of the evolution of nonperforming loans growth. Furthermore,
the feedback eect of nonperforming loans to the economy is fully attested.
6 Conclusion
The 2008 crisis highlighted the importance to properly accessing the impact of macroeconomic con-
ditions on the nancial system vulnerabilities. Most of the literature on the subject has analysed
the issue by assessing the impact of macroeconomic determinants on nonperforming loans or non-
performing loans ratio. Nonetheless, these studies usually entail a panel data analysis which may
hide the dierent dynamics between macro conditions and doubtful loans for each country. Hence,
this study examined the specic dynamics presented by nonperforming loans in the Portuguese
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economy.
Empirical results demonstrate that the macroeconomic environment and the credit supply are
important drivers of asset quality in this economy. Furthermore ndings corroborate the notion
that periods of economic contraction - marked by high levels of unemployment and falling GDP -
contribute to the growth of nonperforming loans. On the other hand, periods of economic expansion
- marked by high GDP and low unemployment rates - imply a deceleration of the growth of nonper-
forming loans. Moreover, results suggest that credit supply expansion may lead to higher levels of
doubtful loans, as riskier loans extended during expansion periods materialize into nonperforming
loans in period of economic contraction.
It was also possible to establish that the growth of nonperforming loans entails a feedback eect
to the economy. The feedback eect is two folded: rstly the adverse response of economic indicators
- GDP and unemployment rate - to a increase in nonperforming loans creates a downward spiral
in which economic distress and nancial system fragilities reinforce each other. Secondly, the high
level of nonperforming loans in banks' balance sheet leads to a retrenchment of the money supply
to the economy. This credit squeeze compromises both aggregate demand and the funding of viable
investment opportunities.
The ndings of this study are relevant to stress testing, carried out by regulatory entities, to
assess the vulnerability of nancial institutions to a macroeconomic shock. Furthermore, the study
highlights the importance of nonperforming loans as a source of frictions in the credit market. Hence,
the importance of regulatory frameworks that prevent the formation of high levels of nonperforming
loans and consequently the negative feedback loop to the economy is attested.
Further research on the subject may attempt to establish the causality link between macroe-
conomic determinants and nonperforming loans across dierent loan categories. This approach
enable the study of the dierent dynamics for each type of nonperforming loan as they might
present dierent responses to macroeconomic shocks. In particular, it would be of interest to disen-
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Figure A.1: GDP and ECOACT
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Response of DUNEM to DUNEM
Figure A.2: VAR - Impulse Response Function
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Figure A.3: VEC - Impulse Response Function
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Figure A.4: VAR - Correlogram
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Figure A.5: VAR with dummy - Correlogram
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Figure A.6: VEC - Correlogram
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Figure A.7: Unit Root Test
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B.1 Tables
Table B.1: Variable description
Vairables Name Description
Coincident indicator of activity ECOACT Year-on-Year rate of change of the Coincident indicator of activity
Industrial Production Index IPI Average through period. The Index is adjusted for working days
M2 M2 End of period National contribution for the euro area M2 monetary aggregates
End of period outstanding amount of nonperforming loans
Nonperforming loans NPL of individuals and non-nancial corporation.
These amounts are adjusted for securities and do not exclude emigrants
Unemployment rate UNEM Unemployment rate seasonally adjusted
Note: The coincident indicator of activity, Industrial Production Index, M2 and nonperforming loans data were
drawn from Bank of Portugal. The unemployment rate was drawn from Eurostat.
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables ECOACT IPI M2 NPL UNEM
Mean 0.85 106.21 133387.40 6586.22 9.09
Median 1.10 108.98 135910.60 3843.07 8.40
Maximum 4.80 118.41 166823.30 18055.24 17.50
Minimum -4.10 90.13 92357.31 2774.05 4.10
Std. Dev. 2.27 7.60 20122.74 4774.14 3.78
Skewness -0.30 -0.51 -0.28 1.25 0.62
Kurtosis 2.52 1.95 2.11 3.11 2.32
Jarque-Bera 4.87 18.17 9.20 52.43 16.91
Probability 0.09 0 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 201 201 201 201 201
Table B.3: NPL Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test
Null Hypothesis: No breakpoints within 15% trimmed data.
Statistic Value Prob.
Maximum LR F-statistic (2008M01) 26.97281 0.00*
Maximum Wald F-statistic (2008M01) 26.97281 0.00*
Note: Probabilities calculated using Hansen's (1997) method.
Signicance levels are denoted as: * signicant at 5% ** signicant at 10%.
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Table B.4: Dickey Fuller Augmented test
Null hypothesis; Variable has a unit root.
Variables ECOACT IPI M2 NPL UNEM
Levels -3.765063* -0.863592 -0.235952 -0.839769 -3.38361
First dierences - -15.72131* -13.82439* -5.125643* -6.530936*
Note: p− value calculated with distribution of Mackinnon (1996).
Signicance levels are denoted as: * signicant at 5% ** signicant at 10%.
Table B.5: VAR - Lag Order Selection Criteria
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
1 1225.43 NA 3.04e-11 -12.86626 -12.59082 -12.75467
2 1417.02 366.8765 4.69e-12 -14.73425 -14.18337* -14.51106
3 1438.47 40.15752 4.443e-12 -14.79221 -13.96588 -14.45741
4 1472.66 62.56872 3.65e-12* -14.98577* -13.884 -14.53937*
5 1482.98 18.43754 3.89e-12 -14.9253 -13.54809 -14.36731
6 1497.03 24.48939 3.98e-12 -14.90442 -13.25176 -14.23482
7 1508.91 20.24499 4.17e-12 -14.86073 -12.93264 -14.07954
8 1519.66 17.83923 4.43e-12 -14.80488 -12.60134 -13.91209
9 1535.56 25.71829 4.46e-12 -14.80386 -12.32489 -13.79947
10 1559.23 37.26129* 4.14e-12 -14.88541 -12.131 -13.76943
11 1569.29 15.42302 4.45e-12 -14.82231 -11.79245 -13.59472
12 1580.91 17.29572 4.71e-12 -14.77563 -11.47033 -13.43645
Note: LR: sequential modied LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) FPE: Final prediction error AIC: Akaike
information criterion SC: Schwarz information criterion HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion.
indicates lag order selected by the criterion indicated by *.
Table B.6: Johansen Cointegration Test
Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.141573 59.26378 35.19275 0.000*
At most 1 * 0.098719 29.49639 20.26184 0.002*
At most 2 * 0.046223 9.228468 9.164546 0.048*
Note: p− value calculated with distribution of Mackinnon (1996).
Signicance levels are denoted as: * signicant at 5% ** signicant at 10%.
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Table B.7: VAR - Estimation Results
DLNPL ECOACT DLM2 DUNEM
DLNPL(-1) -0.022366 -0.183499 0.018961 0.459676
-0.07176 -0.33678 -0.03709 -0.4839
[-0.31168] [-0.54486] [ 0.51128] [ 0.94995]
DLNPL(-2) 0.163557 0.226036 0.046295 0.665334
-0.06857 -0.3218 -0.03544 -0.46236
[ 2.38535]* [ 0.70242] [ 1.30643] [ 1.43898]
DLNPL(-3) 0.280905 -0.12994 0.055673 -0.475387
-0.0688 -0.3229 -0.03556 -0.46395
[ 4.08276]* [-0.40242] [ 1.56571] [-1.02465]
DLNPL(-4) 0.230631 -0.403485 -0.0308 0.943085
-0.07225 -0.33906 -0.03734 -0.48716
[ 3.19234]* [-1.19002] [-0.82492] [ 1.93587]**
ECOACT(-1) -0.018633 1.8875 0.007753 -0.19335
-0.01417 -0.0665 -0.00732 -0.09555
[-1.31496] [ 28.3833]* [ 1.05873] [-2.02357]*
ECOACT(-2) 0.002901 -0.458463 -0.011232 0.343974
-0.03031 -0.14224 -0.01566 -0.20437
[ 0.09573] [-3.22317]* [-0.71711] [ 1.68306]**
ECOACT(-3) 0.034161 -0.881792 -0.002034 -0.179621
-0.03062 -0.14371 -0.01583 -0.20649
[ 1.11557] [-6.13578]* [-0.12850] [-0.86987]
ECOACT(-4) -0.019556 0.445597 0.007581 0.026241
-0.01459 -0.06849 -0.00754 -0.09841
[-1.34003] [ 6.50588]* [ 1.00515] [ 0.26665]
DLM2(-1) -0.067099 0.421258 -0.113154 0.477735
-0.14583 -0.6844 -0.07537 -0.98337
[-0.46011] [ 0.61551] [-1.50139] [ 0.48581]
DLM2(-2) 0.178669 1.727707 -0.032356 -0.115086
-0.1437 -0.67441 -0.07427 -0.96901
[ 1.24333] [ 2.56181]* [-0.43568] [-0.11877]
DLM2(-3) 0.107717 -0.698288 -0.070759 -0.920124
-0.14259 -0.66921 -0.07369 -0.96154
[ 0.75541] [-1.04345] [-0.96018] [-0.95693]
DLM2(-4) 0.170371 -0.542988 0.043298 0.272717
-0.14176 -0.66532 -0.07326 -0.95594
[ 1.20179] [-0.81613] [ 0.59098] [ 0.28529]
DUNEM(-1) 0.006344 -0.045565 0.002892 0.619597
-0.01097 -0.05151 -0.00567 -0.07401
[ 0.57809] [-0.88464] [ 0.50992] [ 8.37221]*
DUNEM(-2) 0.008166 0.041591 -0.004168 0.151276
-0.01239 -0.05814 -0.0064 -0.08353
[ 0.65921] [ 0.71539] [-0.65101] [ 1.81096]**
DUNEM(-3) -0.013092 0.028336 -0.006221 -0.265917
-0.01233 -0.05786 -0.00637 -0.08314
[-1.06187] [ 0.48971] [-0.97631] [-3.19844]*
DUNEM(-4) 0.017091 0.061316 -0.003814 0.12169
-0.01052 -0.04939 -0.00544 -0.07096
[ 1.62413] [ 1.24153] [-0.70133] [ 1.71487]**
R-squared 0.31835 0.99869 0.207996 0.543859
Adj. R-squared 0.261546 0.998581 0.141996 0.505847
Sum sq. resids 0.056362 1.241403 0.015054 2.562839
S.E. equation 0.017695 0.083046 0.009145 0.119323
F-statistic 5.604342 9150.94 3.151445 14.30764
Log likelihood 520.987 217.9515 650.3651 146.9139
Akaike AIC -5.152928 -2.06073 -6.473114 -1.335857
Schwarz SC -4.885327 -1.793129 -6.205512 -1.068255
Mean dependent 0.008561 0.747449 0.00225 0.042347
S.D. dependent 0.020592 2.204784 0.009873 0.169744
Note: 196 observations included. t − statistics presented in brackets.
Signicance levels are denoted as: * signicant at 5%,** signicant at 10%.
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Table B.8: VAR with dummy - Estimation Results
DLNPL ECOACT DLM2 DUNEM
DLNPL(-1) -0.082057 -0.030901 0.016065 0.617602
-0.07319 -0.34923 -0.03871 -0.50344
[-1.12117] [-0.08849] [ 0.41499] [ 1.22677]
DLNPL(-2) 0.083882 0.429721 0.042429 0.876131
-0.07246 -0.34577 -0.03833 -0.49846
[ 1.15756] [ 1.24278] [ 1.10694] [ 1.75768]**
DLNPL(-3) 0.200743 0.074992 0.051783 -0.263299
-0.07274 -0.34709 -0.03848 -0.50036
[ 2.75969]* [ 0.21606] [ 1.34586] [-0.52622]
DLNPL(-4) 0.16932 -0.246745 -0.033775 1.105299
-0.0738 -0.35214 -0.03904 -0.50764
[ 2.29431]* [-0.70069] [-0.86522] [ 2.17732]*
ECOACT(-1) -0.009517 1.864196 0.008195 -0.217468
-0.01422 -0.06788 -0.00752 -0.09785
[-0.66903] [ 27.4649]* [ 1.08921] [-2.22252]*
ECOACT(-2) -0.006978 -0.433206 -0.011712 0.370113
-0.02988 -0.14258 -0.0158 -0.20553
[-0.23355] [-3.03842]* [-0.74102] [ 1.80074]**
ECOACT(-3) 0.024921 -0.85817 -0.002482 -0.155174
-0.03016 -0.14392 -0.01595 -0.20747
[ 0.82622] [-5.96276]* [-0.15557] [-0.74792]
ECOACT(-4) -0.009307 0.419396 0.008078 -0.000875
-0.01472 -0.07023 -0.00778 -0.10124
[-0.63238] [ 5.97194]* [ 1.03770] [-0.00865]
DLM2(-1) -0.069764 0.428071 -0.113283 0.484787
-0.14286 -0.68165 -0.07556 -0.98265
[-0.48835] [ 0.62799] [-1.49919] [ 0.49334]
DLM2(-2) 0.170261 1.749201 -0.032764 -0.09284
-0.1408 -0.67182 -0.07447 -0.96849
[ 1.20927] [ 2.60366]* [-0.43995] [-0.09586]
DLM2(-3) 0.070248 -0.602502 -0.072577 -0.820992
-0.14027 -0.66929 -0.07419 -0.96484
[ 0.50082] [-0.90020] [-0.97822] [-0.85091]
DLM2(-4) 0.150405 -0.491947 0.042329 0.32554
-0.13904 -0.66343 -0.07354 -0.95638
[ 1.08177] [-0.74152] [ 0.57557] [ 0.34039]
DUNEM(-1) 0.008289 -0.050537 0.002987 0.614451
-0.01077 -0.0514 -0.0057 -0.07409
[ 0.76959] [-0.98328] [ 0.52421] [ 8.29309]*
DUNEM(-2) 0.009525 0.038117 -0.004102 0.147681
-0.01214 -0.05795 -0.00642 -0.08353
[ 0.78436] [ 0.65782] [-0.63860] [ 1.76795]**
DUNEM(-3) -0.013254 0.028749 -0.006229 -0.26549
-0.01208 -0.05763 -0.00639 -0.08308
[-1.09736] [ 0.49886] [-0.97501] [-3.19566]*
DUNEM(-4) 0.01693 0.061728 -0.003822 0.122116
-0.01031 -0.04919 -0.00545 -0.07091
[ 1.64233] [ 1.25492] [-0.70094] [ 1.72214]**
CRISIS 0.008925 -0.022817 0.000433 -0.023614
-0.00305 -0.01454 -0.00161 -0.02096
[ 2.92949]* [-1.56952] [ 0.26873] [-1.12677]
R-squared 0.349536 0.998708 0.208316 0.547071
Adj. R-squared 0.291394 0.998593 0.137551 0.506586
Sum sq. resids 0.053784 1.224551 0.015047 2.544789
S.E. equation 0.017334 0.082711 0.009169 0.119234
F-statistic 6.011751 8648.907 2.943765 13.51285
Log likelihood 525.5763 219.291 650.4047 147.6066
Akaike AIC -5.189554 -2.064194 -6.463313 -1.33272
Schwarz SC -4.905228 -1.779868 -6.178987 -1.048394
Mean dependent 0.008561 0.747449 0.00225 0.042347
S.D. dependent 0.020592 2.204784 0.009873 0.169744
Note: 196 observations included. t − statistics presented in brackets.
Signicance levels are denoted as: * signicant at 5%,** signicant at 10%.
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Table B.9: VEC - Estimation Results
LNPL(-1) LIPI(-1) LM2(-1) UNEM(-1) C
1 -21.9772 12.5432 -0.688 -47.7684
-7.3093 -2.6958 -0.1769
[-3.0067] [ 4.6528] [-3.8874]
Error Correction: D(LNPL) D(LIPI) D(LM2) D(UNEM)
CointEq1 0.00997 -0.000491 -0.001525 0.010678
-0.0021 -0.00142 -0.0006 -0.00756
[ 4.74602]* [-0.34590] [-2.54410]* [ 1.41209]
D(LNPL(-1)) -0.203778 0.010842 0.007064 -0.129007
-0.0746 -0.0504 -0.02128 -0.26851
[-2.73175]* [ 0.21510] [ 0.33189] [-0.48046]
D(LNPL(-2)) -0.307599 -0.066734 0.01855 0.535479
-0.07426 -0.05017 -0.02119 -0.26729
[-4.14235]* [-1.33006] [ 0.87553] [ 2.00339]*
D(LNPL(-3)) 0.121312 0.025115 0.010278 -0.33819
-0.07596 -0.05132 -0.02167 -0.27341
[ 1.59711] [ 0.48936] [ 0.47424] [-1.23694]
D(LNPL(-4)) -0.185011 -0.013626 -0.006512 0.02974
-0.07415 -0.0501 -0.02116 -0.26688
[-2.49525]* [-0.27198] [-0.30783] [ 0.11143]
D(LIPI(-1)) 0.212479 -0.583015 -0.067525 -0.424836
-0.11835 -0.07997 -0.03377 -0.426
[ 1.79535]** [-7.29074]* [-1.99965]* [-0.99727]
D(LIPI(-2)) 0.04054 -0.338773 -0.029006 -1.009721
-0.13201 -0.0892 -0.03767 -0.47518
[ 0.30709] [-3.79799]* [-0.77008] [-2.12494]*
D(LIPI(-3)) 0.05447 -0.111918 -0.046705 -0.90542
-0.13004 -0.08786 -0.0371 -0.46806
[ 0.41888] [-1.27378] [-1.25881] [-1.93441]**
D(LIPI(-4)) -0.036803 -0.145329 -0.056884 -0.698105
-0.11015 -0.07442 -0.03143 -0.39647
[-0.33413] [-1.95275]** [-1.81000]** [-1.76082]**
D(LM2(-1)) 0.134988 0.110202 -0.03492 0.579333
-0.25801 -0.17433 -0.07362 -0.92869
[ 0.52320] [ 0.63215] [-0.47435] [ 0.62382]
D(LM2(-2)) -0.100046 -0.322486 0.041773 0.093031
-0.25448 -0.17194 -0.07261 -0.91598
[-0.39315] [-1.87552]** [ 0.57531] [ 0.10156]
D(LM2(-3)) -0.016906 0.231872 -0.010378 -1.399438
-0.25268 -0.17073 -0.0721 -0.90952
[-0.06690] [ 1.35811] [-0.14395] [-1.53865]
D(LM2(-4)) 0.030235 0.001025 0.151173 0.454517
-0.25519 -0.17243 -0.07281 -0.91855
[ 0.11848] [ 0.00594] [ 2.07619]* [ 0.49482]
D(UNEM(-1)) 0.033237 -0.008257 0.002969 0.607138
-0.02063 -0.01394 -0.00589 -0.07426
[ 1.61113] [-0.59237] [ 0.50434] [ 8.17616]*
D(UNEM(-2)) -0.01842 -0.008451 -0.006763 0.18896
-0.0231 -0.01561 -0.00659 -0.08315
[-0.79739] [-0.54143] [-1.02598] [ 2.27249]*
D(UNEM(-3)) -0.004025 0.010375 -0.008244 -0.304031
-0.02308 -0.01559 -0.00659 -0.08307
[-0.17438] [ 0.66530] [-1.25188] [-3.65972]*
D(UNEM(-4)) 0.039589 -0.014089 -0.004562 0.146694
-0.01981 -0.01338 -0.00565 -0.0713
[ 1.99848]* [-1.05258] [-0.80704] [ 2.05730]*
C 0.011523 0.0000218 0.00225 0.014687
-0.00325 -0.0022 -0.00093 -0.0117
[ 3.54367]* [ 0.00993] [ 2.42522]* [ 1.25483]
R-squared 0.292831 0.328773 0.17767 0.55728
Adj. R-squared 0.225293 0.264667 0.099133 0.514997
Sum sq. resids 0.191986 0.08765 0.01563 2.487433
S.E. equation 0.032842 0.02219 0.009371 0.118213
F-statistic 4.335762 5.128591 2.262245 13.17999
Log likelihood 400.8757 477.7144 646.6827 149.8407
Akaike AIC -3.906894 -4.690963 -6.41513 -1.345313
Schwarz SC -3.605843 -4.389912 -6.114078 -1.044262
Mean dependent 0.008617 -0.000601 0.00225 0.042347
S.D. dependent 0.037313 0.025878 0.009873 0.169744
Note: 196 observations included. t − statistics presented in brackets.
Signicance levels are denoted as: * signicant at 5%,** signicant at 10%.
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Table B.10: VAR - Variance Decomposition of DLNPL
Period S.E. DLNPL ECOACT DLM2 DUNEM
1 0.017695 100 0 0 0
2 0.017794 98.95556 0.745241 0.060566 0.238637
3 0.018355 95.11444 2.977715 1.184477 0.723367
4 0.019103 94.50468 3.65161 1.159988 0.683726
5 0.019904 91.54129 5.229174 1.495659 1.733881
6 0.020233 89.50475 7.119328 1.471165 1.90476
7 0.020769 87.57553 8.839099 1.598475 1.9869
8 0.021166 86.09738 10.39267 1.582207 1.927743
9 0.02154 84.57889 11.86147 1.6404 1.919236
10 0.02184 83.37568 13.11811 1.638675 1.867539
11 0.022126 82.41104 14.08896 1.677892 1.822105
12 0.022347 81.63188 14.89237 1.687688 1.788059
Note: The ordering for the Cholesky decomposition was specied as: DLNPL; DUNEM; DLM2 and ECOACT.
Impulse Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations











































Note: Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h. Chi− square with 16 df.
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Note: Residual Heteroskedasticity test includes cross terms.
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